Fuses Set but Hezbollah Not Lighting the Match: The Dominant Political Actor in Lebanon Limiting the Risk of Large-Scale Political War

Hezbollah;Hizballah;Lebanon;political war;political violence;power-sharing;consociational

Aoun, Elias

University:Havard University

Department:International Relations

关键词: Hezbollah;    Hizballah;    Lebanon;    political war;    political violence;    power-sharing;    consociational;   

Others  :  https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/42004225/AOUN-DOCUMENT-2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

美国|英语

来源: Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard

【 摘 要 】

This thesis examined the effects of a dominant political actor on the severity of political war in a country. I argue that the dominant political actor can influence the severity of political violence by virtue of their ability to apply and respond to violence themselves. In fragile states, however, the dominant political actor is often contested by other actors, both diplomatically and with violence. Evidence from Lebanon between 2011 to 2017 supports these claims. In particular, a fragile state unable to sustain itself autonomously leaves room for regional sponsors, domestic actors and opposing forces to advance their strategic goals within the country. In the circumstance of Lebanon, this meant taking on the dominant political actor, Hezbollah. Throughout the time frame studied, Hezbollah operated alongside or against the Future Movement, ISIS, various groups of Sunni extremists, the Lebanese Armed Forces, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, all of whom were active in Lebanon and committed to their own goals and ideals relating to the Syrian civil war and spillover into Lebanon. Based on case studies analyzing key events of political violence and/or conflict in Lebanon after 2011 in this thesis, these findings suggest that the dominant political actor in a country can sway political violence in a particular direction, depending on the goals of the dominant actor. Insights from the literatures on large-scale political violence as well as specific characteristics of the Lebanese domestic political climate stated that the outbreak of large-scale political violence is dependent mainly on the consociational form of governance allowing for equal representation and open lines of communication between the competing political groups. This chief rival hypothesis was refuted by the research with all but two cases showing that the power-sharing system in Lebanon during a time of crisis is either irrelevant or ineffective. The literature also states two other key factors affecting political violence. The second rival hypothesis of a domestic state-led government supported by domestic non-state actor(s) is best suited to establish peace, security, and development with the nation was proven false as well since the Lebanese government was unable to maintain control of the state and their own governing body throughout most of the time frame observed. This study supports the third rival hypothesis of domestic actors using transnational ties to regional sponsors to gain power domestically. This is done in exchange for aligning their views with those of the respective sponsors goals, and in the case of Lebanon between 2011-2017, political war was not a said goal for any party. I find instead that the strategic goals of the dominant political actor can sway the level of violence, venturing to or away from large-scale political violence. To explain the relationship, I hypothesize that Hezbollah, being the dominant political actor, was able to control the distribution and growth of violence in Lebanon between 2011 and 2017, in which their strategic interests did not include the spread of large-scale political war.