Looking Beyond the Battlefield: Charting Islamist Militant Paths to Non-Violent Politics

Islamist;militant;terrorist;terrorism;politics;Hizballah;Sadr;HAMAS;Moro Islamic Liberation Front;Global Security Studies

Butterworth, DavidStout, Mark ;

Johns Hopkins University

关键词: Islamist;    militant;    terrorist;    terrorism;    politics;    Hizballah;    Sadr;    HAMAS;    Moro Islamic Liberation Front;    Global Security Studies;   

Others  :  https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37210/BUTTERWORTH-THESIS-2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: JOHNS HOPKINS DSpace Repository

【 摘 要 】

The growing participation of militant groups in non-violent political activities poses a vexing conundrum to citizens and policymakers: to risk legitimizing violence by allowing militants to have a political voice, or to risk perpetuating violence by proscribing militants’ participation.Before militant groups even decide to become involved in non-violent political activity, however, they must experience some form of transformation that alters their view of violence as the best or sole means by which to achieve their political goals.What factors, then, encourage these groups to decide ideas are more effective at achieving political goals?This is the question I will answer in this thesis.In chapter one, I examine the history of two Shia Muslim militant groups—the Sadrists in Iraq and Lebanese Hizballah—who now play significant if not dominant political roles in their countries.I show that the political and theological reputation of each group among Shia played a significant role in their decision to make this transition.Further, I demonstrate that despite ties to Iran, domestic concerns were more influential in their transformations.In chapter two, I examine two Sunni Muslim groups, Palestinian HAMAS and the Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front.I study their transitions through the lens of the evolution of Islamic political thought since the 19th century.In that context, I demonstrate that the political transitions of these groups are a natural step, despite regional differences in their approaches.In chapter three, I re-visit the examples of HAMAS, Hizballah, and the Sadrists to evaluate their actions amid the explosion of turmoil in the Middle East since 2011—with the Syrian civil war, the rise of the self-styled Islamic State in Iraq, and the 2014 Israel-HAMAS war—against conclusions I reached in previous chapters.I show that while the Sadrists and Hizballah largely acted to preserve their domestic political legitimacy, HAMAS took risks that jeopardized it.In conclusion, I demonstrate militant groups do not respond to solely to a standard menu of influences when deciding to transition to non-violent politics.Instead, each responds to variables unique to their respective domestic contexts when deciding to exchange bullets for ballots, as the expression goes.I thank my reviewers, Ryan Evans and Shiraz Maher, for their very valuable feedback, and my advisor, Sarah O’Byrne, for her insight and steady guidance.Any mistakes in this paper are mine alone.