Investigating Corruption

Prendergast, Canice

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AGENCY PROBLEMS;    BENCHMARK;    BRIBERY;    BRIBES;    COLLUSION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2500
RP-ID  :  WPS2500

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Agency theory has had little to sayabout the control of bureaucratic corruption, perhaps thegreatest agency problem that exists. The author considersthe role of incentive contracting in reducing corruptionthrough the use of independent investigations-a common wayto monitor corruption. In simple settings, bureaucraticcorruption can be suppressed by rewarding and penalizingbureaucrats, depending on the independentinvestigators' findings. But the author shows thatincentive contracts can change behavior in both undesirableand beneficial ways. He analyzes three possible harmfulbehavioral responses to investigations. 1) Manyinvestigations are (officially) instigated by customercomplaints. Bureaucrats could become overinterested in"keeping the customer happy," even when it is notefficient to do so. 2) Bureaucrats often have privateinformation on how cases should be handled, information thatis hard for investigators to verify. The author shows thatinvestigations can give bureaucrats excessive incentives to"do things by the book," offering decisions thatare more likely to be consistent with the opinions of theirsuperiors. 3) Bureaucrats sometimes collect bribes to"look the other way"-that is, ignore knowntransgressions. A solution to this problem might be to offerrewards for bringing cases to light, but a bureaucrat couldthen waste resources by generating "nuisancecases" simply to receive the bonus. In each of thesecases, harmful responses to investigations and incentivesmay be costly enough that it would be more efficient simplyto pay a flat wage and accept some corruption. In otherwords, incentive contracts may not work so well in reducingbureaucratic corruption, because of the variety ofdysfunctional responses that investigations may elicit. Itmay be best to limit investigations to cases where theinvestigator can find direct evidence of wrongdoing (forexample, cash being handed over, or bureaucrats livingbeyond their means).