Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms

Svensson, Jakob

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: BRIBERY;    BRIBES;    CAPITAL GOODS;    CIVIL SERVANTS;    COMPETITIVENESS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2486
RP-ID  :  WPS2486

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The author exploits a unique data set oncorruption containing information about estimated bribepayments by Ugandan firms. To guide the empirical analysis,he develops a simple rent-extortion model, which yieldspredictions on both the incidence of bribery, and the amountpaid. Both predictions are consistent with the data. Firmstypically have to pay bribes when dealing with publicofficials whose actions directly affect the firms'business operations. And the amount paid in bribes is not afixed sum for a set of public services, but depends on thefirm's ability to pay. Controlling for other potentialexplanations of the relationship between "ability topay" and equilibrium graft, the author shows that themore a firm can pay, the more it has to pay.