Cooperation and Reciprocity in Carbon Sequestration Contracts

Cordero Salas, Paula

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AFFORESTATION;    AMOUNT OF CREDITS;    ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION;    BIODIVERSITY;    BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6521
RP-ID  :  WPS6521

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper studies the role ofcooperation and reciprocity on the structure ofself-enforcing carbon sequestration contracts. The optimalcontract is derived as a result of the optimizing actions ofpurely self-interested agents, and agents that act accordingto social or egoistic preferences. The analysis finds thatbuyers' preferences do not affect contract structureunless the buyer is averse to inequality. In contrast, theoptimal payment rule is directly related to theseller's preferences as the payment must motivate theseller to comply with forest conservation. It also findsthat the presence of altruistic or warm glow preferencesincreases the likelihood of cooperation in the long-termrelationship relative to the case of selfish parties. Theseresults imply that agencies or organizations that are notonly concerned about carbon sequestration but also haveobjectives related to the economic development of small landholders may be more successful in the implementationcontracts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.