Addressing Additionality in REDD Contracts When Formal Enforcement Is Absent

Cordero Salas, Paula ; Roe, Brian ; Sohngen, Brent

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AFFORESTATION;    AFFORESTATION PROJECTS;    AGRICULTURE;    ALLOCATION OF LAND;    ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6502
RP-ID  :  WPS6502

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The success of reducing carbon emissionsfrom deforestation and forest degradation depends on thedesign of an effective financial mechanism that provideslandholders sufficient incentives to participate and provideadditional and permanent carbon offsets. This paper proposesself-enforcing contracts as a potential solution for theconstraints in formal contract enforcement derived from thestylized facts of reducing emissions from deforestation andforest degradation implementation in developing countries.It characterizes the optimal self-enforcing contract andprovides the parameters under which private enforcement issustainable when the seller type that is, the opportunitycost of the land, is private information. The optimalcontract suggests that the seller with low opportunity costreceives a positive enforceable payment equivalent to theinformation rents required for self-selection, in contrastto when the buyer knows the seller type in which case allpayments should be made contingent on additional forestconservation. When the buyer does not know the seller type,a first-best self-enforcing contract can be implemented ifforest conservation is sufficiently productive. If the gainsfrom forest conservation are small, self-enforcing contractsmay induce some carbon sequestration by some or all sellertypes, depending on the value of the shared gains of the relationship.