Participation in WTO DisputeSettlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders

Bown, Chad P.

Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank

关键词: AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS;    ANTIDUMPING;    ANTIDUMPING MEASURES;    ANTIDUMPING PETITIONS;    AUCTION;   

DOI  :  10.1093/wber/lhi009
RP-ID  :  77492

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

What affects a country's decisionof whether to formally engage in a trade dispute directlyrelated to its exporting interests? This article empiricallyexamines determinants of affected country participationdecisions in formal trade litigation arising under the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) between 1995 and 2000. Itinvestigates determinants of nonparticipation and examineswhether the incentives generated by the system's rulesand procedures discourage active engagement in disputesettlement by developing country members in particular.Though the size of exports at stake is found to be animportant economic determinant affecting the decision toparticipate in challenges to a WTO-inconsistent policy, theevidence also shows that measures of a country'sretaliatory and legal capacity as well as its internationalpolitical economy relationships matter. These results areconsistent with the hypothesis of an implicit'institutional bias' generated by thesystem's rules and incentives that particularly affectsdeveloping economy participation in dispute settlement.