How Different are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies toward Steel

Bown, Chad P.

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AD VALOREM;    AGGREGATE TRADE;    AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS;    AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES;    ANTIDUMPING;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6378
RP-ID  :  WPS6378

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Use of temporary trade barriers hasproliferated across countries, industries, and even policyinstruments. This paper constructs a panel of bilateral,product-level United States steel imports that are matchedto a unique data set on trade policy exclusions that areassociated with the 2002 United States steel safeguard inorder to compare the trade impacts that result fromapplication of various temporary trade barrier policies over1989-2003. The analysis finds that the trade effects of anapplied safeguard -- which is statutorily expected to followthe principle of nondiscriminatory treatment -- cannevertheless compare closely with the application of theexplicitly discriminatory antidumping policy. The results ontrade policy substitutability complement other recentresearch on these increasingly important forms of import protection.