Optional games on cycles and complete graphs

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:356

Article

Jeong, Hyeong-Chai^1,2  Oh, Seung-Yoon¹  Allen, Benjamin^2,3  Nowak, Martin A.^2,4,5 

[1] Sejong Univ, Dept Phys, Seoul 143747, South Korea

[2] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Emmanuel Coll, Dept Math, Boston, MA 02115 USA

[4] Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[5] Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

关键词: Evolutionary game theory;    Evolutionary graph theory;    Evolution of cooperation;    Spatial games;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.04.025

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition, there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by adopting loner strategies. Optional games lead to relaxed social dilemmas. Here we explore the interaction between spatial structure and optional games. We find that increasing the number of loner strategies (or equivalently increasing mutational bias toward loner strategies) facilitates evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed and in structured populations. We derive various limits for weak selection and large population size. For some cases we derive analytic results for strong selection. We also analyze strategy selection numerically for finite selection intensity and discuss combined effects of optionality and spatial structure. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free