Evolutionary shift dynamics on a cycle

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:311

Article

Allen, Benjamin¹  Nowak, Martin A.^1,2 

[1] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

关键词: Evolutionary game theory;    Evolutionary graph theory;    Cooperation;    Fixation probability;    Adaptive dynamics;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.006

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

We present a new model of evolutionary dynamics in one-dimensional space. Individuals are arranged on a cycle. When a new offspring is born, another individual dies and the rest shift around the cycle to make room. This rule, which is inspired by spatial evolution in somatic tissue and microbial colonies, has the remarkable property that, in the limit of large population size, evolution acts to maximize the payoff of the whole population. Therefore, social dilemmas, in which some individuals benefit at the expense of others, are resolved. We demonstrate this principle for both discrete and continuous games. We also discuss extensions of our model to other one-dimensional spatial configurations. We conclude that shift dynamics in one dimension is an unusually strong promoter of cooperative behavior. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free