A Probabilistic Mechanism Design for Online Auctions

IEEE Access

Fei-Yue Wang¹  Jie Zhang¹  Linjing Li¹ 

[1]State Key Laboratory of Management and Control for Complex Systems, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

关键词: Mechanism design;    online auctions;    randomized mechanisms;    e-commerce;    computational experiments;    probabilistic mechanism design;   

DOI  :  10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2705120

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Recently, there has been a rapid growth of the online auctions in e-commerce platforms, in which small and/or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) heavily depend on the advertising systems. In this paper, we design flexible mechanisms to reduce the competition of SMEs without affecting competitive large companies in order to maximize the profit of e-commerce platform and to keep the ecosystem healthy. A probabilistic pricing mechanism design approach is investigated for online auctions. Utilizing this approach, we introduce the notation of simple mechanisms as a tool for designing new mechanisms. Based on a simple and a classical, the proposed mechanism probabilistic mechanisms are designed and their properties are analyzed. Furthermore, we devise two mechanism design algorithms for different application scenarios. Experiments are presented to demonstrate the flexibility and the effectiveness of the proposed probabilistic mechanism design approach.

【 授权许可】

Unknown