Desired Features and Design Methodologies of Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in the Public-Key Infrastructure Setting

Computer Science;authentication;authenticated key exchange;Diffie-Hellman;Station-to-Station protocol;STS

Wang, Hao-Hsien

University of Waterloo

关键词: Computer Science;    authentication;    authenticated key exchange;    Diffie-Hellman;    Station-to-Station protocol;    STS;   

Others  :  https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/10012/1087/1/hbwang2004.pdf

瑞士|英语

来源: UWSPACE Waterloo Institutional Repository

【 摘 要 】

The importance of an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol haslong been known in the field of cryptography. Two of the questionsstill being asked today are (1) what properties or features does asecure AKE protocol possess, and (2) How does one, in a step bystep fashion, create a secure AKE protocol? This thesis aims toanswer these two questions.The thesis contains two parts: one is a survey of previous workson the desired features of the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol,and the other is a study of a previously proposed designmethodology in designing secure AKE protocols, as well ascontributing an original idea of such methodologies. Descriptionsand comparisons of the two design methodologies are included.The thesis surveys the literature and conducts a case study of theSTS protocol, analyzes various attacks on STS through some knownattacks to it, and extracts the desired properties and features ofa secure AKE protocol via the case study. This part of the thesisdoes not propose any new result, but summarizes a complete list ofissues one should take consideration of while designing an AKEprotocol. We also show that at the end of this part, a secureversion of STS which possesses the desired features of an AKEprotocol.The other major part of the thesis surveys one design methodologyof creating a secure AKE protocol by Bellare, Canetti, andKrawczyk; it is based on having a secure key exchange protocolthen adding (mutual) authentication to it. The thesis thenproposes another original design methodology; it starts with asecure mutual authentication protocol, then adds the secure keyexchange feature without modifying overheads and number of flowsof the original mutual authentication protocol. We show in thispart the ;;secure;; AKE protocol developed through these two designapproaches is identical to the secure version of STS described inthe other part, and thus possesses the desired features of asecure AKE protocol. We also give a proof of security of thesecure AKE protocol developed under our design methodology.