Military Expenditure : Threats, Aid, and Arms Races

Collier, Paul ; Hoeffler, Anke

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACTIONS;    ARMAMENTS;    ARMS;    ARMS RACE;    CIVIL CONFLICT;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2927
RP-ID  :  WPS2927

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Using global data for the period1960-99, the authors estimate neighborhood arms races. Theyfind that the level of military expenditure is stronglyinfluenced by the expenditure of neighbors. The authorsestimate an "arms race multiplier," finding thatan initial exogenous increase in military expenditure by onecountry is more than doubled in both the originating countryand its neighbor. An implication is that militaryexpenditure is, to an extent, a "regional publicbad." Potentially, there is an offsetting public goodeffect if rebellions are deterred by military expenditure.However, instrumenting for military expenditure, the authorsfind no deterrence effect of military spending on the riskof internal conflict. So there appears to be no regionalpublic good effect offsetting the public bad arising from aneighborhood arms race.