Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation

Eskeland, Gunnar S.

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AGGREGATE DEMAND;    AGGREGATE PRODUCTION;    AIR POLLUTANT;    AIR POLLUTION;    AIR POLLUTION CONTROL;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2510
RP-ID  :  WPS2510

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Struck by the fact that economists didnot have a plausible model for why emissions standards, andmandated technologies, play a dominant role in pollutioncontrol, the author sought answers to two questions: 1)Should one stimulate emissions reductions by firms, andhouseholds, rich and poor, in the same way? 2) How shouldone combine instruments that make activities cleaner, withinstruments that shift the economy toward less-pollutingactivities? Using clean air as an example of a pure publicgood, he shows the role of emissions taxes, or suchsurrogate instruments, as emissions standards, andpresumptive Pigouvian taxes. To illustrate the combinationof demand management, and technical controls, he computes amarginal cost curve for emissions reductions in the form ofcleaner cars, and fuels. And he estimates a demand model forcars, and driving. The result: under the assumption thatrevenue, and re-distributive transfers bear no premia, thecost of reducing pollution in Mexico City increases fortyfour percent if an emissions standards program is used, andthe presumptive Pigouvian tax on gasoline is not. Theimportant finding, as costly redistribution, and revenuegeneration are introduced, is that this influences thegeneral scheme of taxation (in well-known ways), and itinfluences the conditions for optimal environmental qualityin accordance with Pigou's conjecture. However, it doesnot change, or invalidate the rankings of technologies, andinterventions on the control cost curve, nor does it changethe role of demand management in environmental protection.