Does the Semi-Autonomous Agency Model Function in a Low-Governance Environment? The Case of the Road Development Agency in Zambia | |
Raballand, Gael ; Bridges, Kate ; Beuran, Monica ; Sacks, Audrey | |
World Bank, Washington, DC | |
关键词: ACCOUNTABILITY; ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS; ANTI-CORRUPTION; AUDITING; AUDITOR; | |
DOI : 10.1596/1813-9450-6585 RP-ID : WPS6585 |
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学科分类:社会科学、人文和艺术(综合) | |
来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository | |
【 摘 要 】
This paper uses Zambia as a case studyto assess empirically whether political interference in alow-governance environment has diminished in the past yearsas expected after a semi-autonomous agency model was set upten years ago. The road sector in Zambia has experiencedsome significant developments since then. The paper usesdata on contract from 2008 to 2011 and analyses a number ofkey trends related to Road Development Agency governance andstaffing dynamics as well as procurement and projectselection within the institution. The main findings indicatethat, after some years of implementation of these reforms,there is reason to question whether the model ofsemi-autonomous agency enables road management to beshielded from political interference. Zambia may be anisolated case but, so far, this model does not seem to havebeen able to decrease political interference in theselection or supervision of projects and there seems to havebeen an increased lack of accountability of civil servantsworking in this sector.
【 预 览 】
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WPS6585.pdf | 468KB | download |