When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption

Basu, Kaushik ; McGavock, Tamara ; Zhang, Boyang

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: BRIBE;    BRIBERY;    BRIBES;    COLLUSION;    COMPETITIVENESS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6596
RP-ID  :  WPS6596

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The paper develops a simple model todemonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition mayexacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participantsengaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs-- maybe because they pay a bribe to avoid installing theenvironmental safeguards required by law -- such that honestplayers are driven out of the market when the market becomessufficiently competitive.