Hierarchy and Information

Rogger, Daniel ; Somani, Ravi

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: INFORMATION;    BUREAUCRACY;    PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION;    DECENTRALIZATION;    OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-8644
RP-ID  :  WPS8644

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

What determines the distribution ofinformation acquired within the hierarchy of a publicorganization? Without market processes, the generation andabsorption of information in bureaucracy relies onindividual actors undertaking costly action to acquire it.This paper reports on comparisons between individual-levelclaims by public officials in the Government of Ethiopiaregarding the characteristics of local constituents theyserve and objective benchmark data. Public officials makelarge errors about their constituents' characteristics.The errors of 49 percent of public officials are at least 50percent of the underlying benchmark data. Given publicofficials' stated reliance on this information to makepublic policy decisions, such mistakes imply a substantialmisallocation of public resources. The results areconsistent with classic theoretical predictions related tothe incentives that determine information acquisition inhierarchies, such as de facto control over decision makingand an organizational culture of valuing operationalinformation. A field experiment implies that theseincentives mediate the effectiveness of interventions aimedat improving the information of public-sector agents.