Cash Transfers Increase Trust in Local Government

Evans, David K. ; Holtemeyer, Brian ; Kosec, Katrina

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS;    SERVICE DELIVERY;    DECENTRALIZATION;    INFORMATION;    COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-8333
RP-ID  :  WPS8333

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

How does a locally-managed conditionalcash transfer program impact trust in government? On the onehand, delivering monetary benefits and increasinginteractions with government officials (elected andappointed) may increase trust. On the other hand, imposingpaternalistic conditions, leading some to experiencefeelings of social stigma or guilt, and potentiallypermitting capture by local elites could reduce trust. Thispaper answers this question by exploiting the randomizedintroduction of a locally-managed transfer program inTanzania in 2010, which included popular election ofcommunity management committees to run the program. Theanalysis reveals that cash transfers can significantlyincrease trust in leaders. This effect is driven by largeincreases in trust in elected leaders as opposed toappointed bureaucrats. Perceptions of governmentresponsiveness to citizens' concerns and honesty ofleaders also rise; these improvements are largest wherethere are more village meetings at baseline. One of thecentral roles of village meetings is to receive and shareinformation with village residents. One indicator thatgovernance may have improved is that records from school andhealth committees are more readily available in treatmentvillages. Notably, while the stated willingness of citizensto participate in community development projects rises,actual participation in projects and the likelihood ofvoting does not. Concerns that local management of a cashtransfer program will destroy trust in government or reducethe quality of governance appear unfounded—especially inhigh-information contexts.