Long-Run Effects of Temporary Incentives on Medical Care Productivity

Celhay, Pablo ; Gertler, Paul ; Giovagnoli, Paula ; Vermeersch, Christel

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: PREMATURE BIRTH;    PHARMACY;    CHILD HEALTH;    BIRTH;    RISKS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7348
RP-ID  :  WPS7348

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The adoption of new clinical practicepatterns by medical care providers is often challenging,even when the patterns are believed to be efficacious andprofitable. This paper uses a randomized field experiment toexamine the effects of temporary financial incentives paidto medical care clinics for the initiation of prenatal carein the first trimester of pregnancy. The rate of earlyinitiation of prenatal care was 34 percent higher in thetreatment group than in the control group while theincentives were being paid, and this effect persisted atleast 15 months and likely 24 months or more after theincentives ended. These results are consistent with a modelwhere the incentives enable providers to address the fixedcosts of overcoming organizational inertia in innovation,and suggest that temporary incentives may be effective atmotivating improvements in long-run provider performance ata substantially lower cost than permanent incentives.