Verifying Missile Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia

Vannoni, Michael G. ; Biringer, Kent L. ; Trost, Lawrence C.

Sandia National Laboratories

关键词: Proliferation;    On-Site Inspection;    Missiles;    98 Nuclear Disarmament, Safeguards, And Physical Protection;    Remote Sensing;   

DOI  :  10.2172/811157
RP-ID  :  SAND2003-1148
RP-ID  :  AC04-94AL85000
RP-ID  :  811157

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

Missiles are attractive weapon systems because of their flexibility, survivability, and relatively low cost. Consequently, many nations are seeking to build missile forces resulting in regional arms races. Missile forces can be both stabilizing (e.g., providing a survivable force for deterrence) and destabilizing (e.g., creating strategic asymmetries). Efforts to control missile proliferation must account for these effects. A number of strategies to control the destabilizing effects of missiles were developed during the Cold War. Some of these strategies are applicable to regional missile control but new approaches, tailored to regional geographic and security conditions, are needed. Regional missile nonproliferation can be pursued in a variety of ways: Reducing the demand for missiles by decreasing the perception of national threats; Restricting the export of missiles and associated equipment by supplier countries; Restricting information describing missile technology; Limiting missile development activities such as flight or engine tests; Restricting the operational deployment of existing missile forces; and Reducing existing missile forces by number and/or type. Even when development is complete, limits on deployment within range of potential targets or limits on operational readiness can help stabilize potential missile confrontations. Implementing these strategies often involves the collection and exchange of information about activities related to missile development or deployment. Monitoring is the process of collecting information used to for subsequent verification of commitments. A systematic approach to implementing verification is presented that identifies areas where monitoring could support missile nonproliferation agreements. The paper presents both non-technical and technical techniques for monitoring. Examples of non-technical techniques are declarations about planned test launches or on-site inspections. Examples of technical monitoring include remote monitoring (i.e., a sensor that is physically present at a facility) and remote sensing (i.e., a sensor that records activity without being physically present at a facility).