JOINT STUDY OF IMPROVED SAFEGUARDS METHODOLOGY USING NO-NOTICE RANDOMIZED INSPECTION AT JNC'S Pu HANDLING FACILITIES

LU,M.S. ; SANBORN,J.B.

Brookhaven National Laboratory

关键词: On-Site Inspection;    98 Nuclear Disarmament, Safeguards, And Physical Protection;    Nuclear Materials Diversion;    Implementation;    Detection;   

DOI  :  10.2172/760984
RP-ID  :  BNL--52586
RP-ID  :  AC02-98CH10886
RP-ID  :  760984

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

After the Iraq war, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 93+2 Program was developed to strengthen and improve the cost-effectiveness of the existing safeguards system. In particular, the Program aims to enhance the IAEA ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities and materials. The IAEA 93+2 Program includes: (1) Increased access to information and its effective use; (2) Increased physical access; (3) Optimum use of the existing system. The measures considered are divided in two parts: measures in Part 1 are those, which may be implemented within the existing IAEA authority; Part 2 measures require complementary legal authority, in the form of an additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540. A description of the status of its implementation can be found in ``Implementation of the Additional Protocol'' (Cooley, 1999). In particular, increased physical access includes access beyond locations requiring additional authorities derived from the INFCIRC/540 and no-notice randomized inspections. No-notice randomized inspections could enhance the inspection effectiveness and efficiency by increasing the coverage of the material involved, providing better confirmation of the operational status of the facilities and higher degree of confidence that no undeclared activities or materials existed at the facilities--including the detection of possible measures to conceal diversions.