In this thesis we present a mechanism design approach to decentralized resourceallocation in wireless and large-scale networks. For wireless networks we study theproblem of power allocation where each user;;s transmissions create interference toall network users, and each user has only partial information about the network. Weinvestigate the problem under two scenarios; the realization theory scenario and theimplementation theory scenario. Under the realization theory scenario, we formu-late the power allocation problem as an allocation problem with externalities, anddevelop a decentralized optimal power allocation algorithm that (i) preserves theprivate information of the users; and (ii) converges to the optimal centralized powerallocation. Under the implementation theory scenario, we formulate the power allo-cation problem as a public good allocation problem, and develop a game form that (i)implements in Nash equilibria the optimal allocations of corresponding centralized power allocation problem; (ii) is individually rational; and (iii) results in budget bal-ance at all Nash equilibria and off equilibria. Later we generalize the wireless networkmodel to study resource allocation in large-scale networks where the actions of eachuser affect the utilities of an arbitrary subset of network users. This generalization ismotivated by several applications including power allocation in large-scale wirelessnetworks where the transmissions of each user create interference to only a subsetof network users. We develop a formal model to study resource allocation problemsin large-scale networks with above characteristics. We formulate two resource allocation prob-lems for the large-scale network model; one for the realization theory scenario, andthe other for the implementation theory scenario. For the realization problem wedevelop a decentralized resource allocation algorithm using the principles of mecha-nism design that (i) preserves the private information of the users; and (ii) convergesto the optimal centralized resource allocation. For the implementation problem wedevelop a game form that (i) implements in Nash equilibria the optimal allocationsof corresponding centralized resource allocation problem; (ii) is individually rational;and (iii) results in budget balance at all Nash equilibria and off equilibria.
【 预 览 】
附件列表
Files
Size
Format
View
A Mechanism Design Approach to Decentralized Resource Allocation in Wireless and Large-Scale Networks: Realization and Implementation.