Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring.

Duran, Felicia Angelica ; Ward, Rebecca ; Cipiti, Benjamin B. ; Middleton, Bobby D.

Sandia National Laboratories

关键词: Probability;    Reprocessing;    Nuclear Fuels;    Monitoring;    Administrative Procedures;   

DOI  :  10.2172/1029760
RP-ID  :  SAND2011-7292
RP-ID  :  AC04-94AL85000
RP-ID  :  1029760

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.