Eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the presence of policing

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:518

Article

Chowdhury, Sayantan Nag¹  Kundu, Srilena¹  Banerjee, Jeet²  Perc, Matjaz^3,4,5  Ghosh, Dibakar¹ 

[1] Indian Stat Inst, Phys & Appl Math Unit, 203 BT Rd, Kolkata 700108, India

[2] Think & Learn Pvt Ltd, BYJUS, IBC Knowledge Pk,4-1 Bannerghatta Main Rd, Bangalore 560029, Karnataka, India

[3] Univ Maribor, Fac Nat Sci & Math, Koroska Cesta 160, Maribor 2000, Slovenia

[4] China Med Univ, China Med Univ Hosp, Dept Med Res, Taichung, Taiwan

[5] Complex Sci Hub Vienna, Josefstadterstr 39, A-1080 Vienna, Austria

关键词: Evolutionary game theory;    Altruistic free space;    Prisoner's dilemma;    Punishment;    Social dilemmas;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110606

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game as a basis for long-term apprehension of the essential social dilemma related to cooperation among unrelated individuals. We upgrade the contemporary PD game with an inclusion of evolution-induced act of punishment as a third competing strategy in addition to the traditional cooperators and defectors. In a population structure, the abundance of ecologically-viable free space often regulates the reproductive opportunities of the constituents. Hence, additionally, we consider the availability of free space as an ecological footprint, thus arriving at a simple eco-evolutionary model, which displays fascinating complex dynamics. As possible outcomes, we report the individual dominance of cooperators and defectors as well as a plethora of mixed states, where different strategies coexist followed by maintaining the diversity in a socio-ecological framework. These states can either be steady or oscillating, whereby oscillations are sustained by cyclic dominance among different combinations of cooperators, defectors, and punishers. We also observe a novel route to cyclic dominance where cooperators, punishers, and defectors enter a coexistence via an inverse Hopf bifurcation that is followed by an inverse period doubling route. (C) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free