Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:477

Article

Mamiya, Azumi¹  Ichinose, Genki¹ 

[1] Shizuoka Univ, Dept Math & Syst Engn, Naka Ku, 3-5-1 Johoku, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 4328561, Japan

关键词: Prisoner's dilemma;    Repeated games;    Observation errors;    Zero-determinant strategies;    Unconditional strategies;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.06.009

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

The theory of repeated games analyzes the long-term relationship of interacting players and mathematically reveals the condition of how cooperation is achieved, which is not achieved in a one-shot game. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma (RPD) game with no errors, zero-determinant (ZD) strategies allow a player to unilaterally set a linear relationship between the player's own payoff and the opponent's payoff regardless of the strategy that the opponent implements. In contrast, unconditional strategies such as ALLD and ALLC also unilaterally set a linear payoff relationship. Errors often happen between players in the real world. However, little is known about the existence of such strategies in the RPD game with errors. Here, we analytically search for all strategies that enforce a linear payoff relationship under observation errors in the RPD game. As a result, we found that, even in the case with observation errors, the only strategy sets that enforce a linear payoff relationship are either ZD strategies or unconditional strategies and that no other strategies can enforce it, which were numerically confirmed. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free