期刊论文详细信息
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 卷:462
Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback
Article
Hauert, Christoph1  Saade, Camille2  McAvoy, Alex3 
[1] Univ British Columbia, Dept Math, 1984 Math Rd, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
[2] Ecole Normale Super, 45 Rue Ulm, F-75005 Paris, France
[3] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, One Brattle Sq,Suite 6, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词: Social dilemmas;    Cooperation;    Ecological feedback;    Evolutionary game theory;   
DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.11.019
来源: Elsevier
PDF
【 摘 要 】

Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are occupied by one individual each. The fitness of individuals is not only determined by interactions with others but also by environmental quality. This heterogeneity results in asymmetric interactions where the characteristics of the interaction may depend on an individual's location. Interestingly, in non-varying heterogeneous environments, the long-term dynamics are the same as for symmetric interactions in an average, homogeneous environment. However, introducing environmental feedback between an individual's strategy and the quality of its patch results in rich eco-evolutionary dynamics. Thus, individuals act as ecosystem engineers. The nature of the feedback and the rate of ecological changes can relax or aggravate social dilemmas and promote persistent periodic oscillations of strategy abundance and environmental quality. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free   

【 预 览 】
附件列表
Files Size Format View
10_1016_j_jtbi_2018_11_019.pdf 1920KB PDF download
  文献评价指标  
  下载次数:0次 浏览次数:0次