Cooperation in a generalized age-structured spatial game

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:484

Article

Santos Souza, Paulo Victor²  Silva, Rafael³  Bauch, Chris¹  Girardi, Daniel¹ 

[1] Univ Waterloo, Dept Appl Math, 200 Univ Ave West, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada

[2] Univ Fed Fluminense, Dept Ciencias Exatas & Licenciaturas, BR-27213145 Volta Redonda, RJ, Brazil

[3] Rua Antonio Barreiros,212 Aterrado, BR-27215350 Volta Redonda, Brazil

关键词: Cooperation;    Evolutionary games;    Game theory;    Age-structured population;    Prisioner's dillema;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.109995

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for evolutionary game theory precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly, in recent years, the search for an understanding of how cooperation can be stimulated, even when it conflicts with individual interest, has intensified. We investigate the emergence of cooperation in an age-structured evolutionary spatial game. In it, players age with time and the payoff that they receive after each round depends on their age. We find that the outcome of the game is strongly influenced by the type of distribution used to modify the payoffs according to the age of each player. The results show that, under certain circumstances, cooperators may not only survive but dominate the population. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free