Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Incentive Mechanism for Green Buildings

2019 3rd International Workshop on Renewable Energy and Development

能源学;生态环境科学

Zhang, Lixing^1 ; Wu, Shaoyan^1

School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin

300384, China^1

关键词: Behavioural changes;    Environmental pollution problem;    Evolutionary equilibriums;    Evolutionary game models;    Evolutionary games;    Financial subsidies;    Government incentive;    Inspection frequency;   

Others  :  https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/267/5/052050/pdf
DOI  :  10.1088/1755-1315/267/5/052050

学科分类：环境科学（综合）

来源: IOP

【 摘 要 】

With the increasingly serious environmental pollution problem, the development of green building scale has become the fundamental way to transform urban development, and this development is the result of continuous game between government, public consumers and developers. In order to analyse the evolutionary equilibrium between the initial strategy and the incentive and constraint adjustment, this paper constructed a three-party evolutionary game model between government, developers and public consumers, and under different subsidy levels, inspection frequency and pollution tax, the government. The behavioural changes of developers and public consumers were simulated. The study found that government financial subsidies, irregular inspections and pollution taxes will have a positive effect on the scale of green buildings. Moderate financial subsidies, low frequency inspections and high pollution taxes have the most obvious effect on the development of green houses.