Evolutionary Game Analysis on Production and Emissions Reduction of Manufacturing Enterprises under Different Carbon Policies

2018 1st International Conference on Environment Prevention and Pollution Control Technology

生态环境科学

Wang, Yongjian^1 ; Wang, Fei^2

School of Business, Jiangsu Normal University, Xuzhou, JIANGSU

221000, China^1

School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing, JIANGSU

211189, China^2

关键词: Dynamic replication;    Emission reduction;    Emissions reduction;    Evolutionary game models;    Evolutionary games;    Evolutionary stable strategies;    Limited rationality;    Manufacturing enterprise;   

Others  :  https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/199/2/022042/pdf
DOI  :  10.1088/1755-1315/199/2/022042

学科分类：环境科学（综合）

来源: IOP

【 摘 要 】

This paper is to analyze the game behaviors of production and emission reduction between government and manufacturing enterprise under different carbon emission policies. To start with, based on different enterprises' behaviors of production and emission reduction under carbon policies of carbon tax and carbon cap and trade, cost-benefit functions for the enterprise and government are constructed respectively. Through the dynamic replication method, an evolutionary game model between enterprises and the government based on limited rationality is built. After that, the problem how participants' behaviors affect evolutionary stable strategies has been discussed. At last, the game analysis results show that both emission reduction cost of enterprise and government penalties on over emission as well as carbon cap would affect not only the government choice of carbon policy, but also the implementation of enterprises' production and emissions reduction.