Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation and Enterprise Emission from the Perspective of Environmental Tax

1st International Global on Renewable Energy and Development

Mai, Yazong^1

State Grid Energy Research Institute, Beijing, China^1

关键词: Environmental governances;    Environmental taxes;    Evolutionary game models;    Evolutionary stable strategies;    Evolutionary system;    Government regulation;    Government regulators;    Strategy adjustments;   

Others  :  https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/100/1/012208/pdf
DOI  :  10.1088/1755-1315/100/1/012208

来源: IOP

【 摘 要 】

In the context of the upcoming implementation of the environmental tax policy, there is a need for a focus on the relationship between government regulation and corporate emissions. To achieve the real effect of environmental tax policy, government need to regulate the illegal emissions of enterprises. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper analyses the strategic set of government regulators and polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy. By using the evolutionary game model, the utility function and payoff matrix of the both sides are constructed, and the evolutionary analysis and strategy adjustment of the environmental governance target and the actual profit of the stakeholders are carried out. Thus, the wrong behaviours could be corrected so that the equilibrium of the evolutionary system can be achieved gradually, which could also get the evolutionary stable strategies of the government and the polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy.