Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment

Games

Kirsten Thommes¹  Christian Grund²  KatjaRebecca Tilkes²  Christine Harbring³ 

[1] Chair of Business Administration esp. Organizational Behavior, Facility of Business, University of Paderborn, Warburger Str. 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany;Chair of HRM and Personnel Economics, RWTH Aachen University, Templergraben 64, 52062 Aachen, Germany;Chair of Organization, RWTH Aachen University, Templergraben 64, 52062 Aachen, Germany;

关键词: cooperation;    public good game;    group membership;    experiment;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g11040061

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

We experimentally compare the consequences for group cooperation of two decision mechanisms involving the extension of group membership. We analyze an exogenous decision (random draw) and an endogenous decision (made by a particular group member) mechanism to extend a temporary agent’s group membership. Our results reveal that the prospect of group membership extension affects not only the temporary but also the permanent group members’ contributions with an endogenous mechanism.

【 授权许可】

Unknown