Reciprocity in Locating Contributions: Experiments on the Neighborhood Public Good Game

Games

Siegfried Berninghaus²  Werner Güth¹ 

[1] Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Strasse 10, Jena, Germany;Institute of Economic Theory and Statistics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Zirkel 2, Karlsruhe, Germany

关键词: public good game;    neighborhood;    cooperation;    experimental analysis;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g4020144

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our experiments, participants can locate their contribution, yielding a small benefit for the participant, who receives the contribution and a small disadvantage for the participant, at the opposite location. This mechanism of individually targeted sanctions helps to foster initial cooperation. It decreases over time, however. Location choices are used to reciprocate, but may not suffice to stabilize voluntary cooperation as an effect observed in the field.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2013 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.