The Brazilian Swindle and the Larger International Monetary Problem

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy

卷:23

关键词: Brazil;    debt;    IMF;    development;   

DOI  :  10.1590/0101-31572004-0709

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

ABSTRACT The IMF’s recent loan to Brazil is the best seen as a mechanism of political control rather than economic assistance, except in a very unsustainable short run. Thus hard choices between the priorities of Brazil’s working population and those of international creditors cannot be avoided. This essay explores policy options, and goes on to suggest that while the financial sector is certain to dominate American policy discussion in these matters, it would be wiser to view the larger national economic interest of the United States as aligned with those who advocate stable and sustainable national development in Brazil.

【 授权许可】

Unknown