Representing Others in a Public Good Game

Games

Karen Evelyn Hauge¹  Ole Rogeberg² 

[1] Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Gaustadalléen 21, Oslo 0349, Norway; E-Mail

关键词: public good game;    lab experiment;    group representative;    gender;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g6030381

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

In many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by group representatives. We present the results from a laboratory experiment that compares decisions made by individuals in inter-individual public good games with decisions made by representatives on behalf of their group in inter-group public good games. Our main finding is that contribution behavior differs between individuals and group representatives, but only for women. While men’s choices are equally self-interested as individuals and group representatives, women make less self-interested choices as group representatives.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.