This thesis investigates the cause of recent surge of Kazakh government’s indirect expropriation methods against International Oil Companies (hereafter IOCs). Although this phenomenon is now beginning to be widely claimed as a phenomenon of economic resource nationalism, an overview of previous studies shows that the exploration of the phenomenon remains incomplete, unable to explain the increasingly more aggressive strategies of indirect expropriation methods in Kazakhstan. This research, therefore, proposes Hirschman’s model of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (hereafter EVL model) to frame the behaviors of domestic Kazakh elites and IOCs, and the overall phenomenon of economic resource nationalism. Overall, the EVL model is applied to test the hypothesis that economic resource nationalism in Kazakhstan occurs because of the voice and loyalty dynamics between the Nazarbayev government (Kazakh elites) and IOCs in times of higher oil price. Also, as a significant portion of this research, the current surge of aggressive indirect expropriation strategies is explained in relation to the projection of eventual retirement of President Nursultan Nazarbayev (incumbent since 1991), emergence of conflicting elite factions in Kazakhstan’s administration, and rising unrest in civil society. By delineating how such domestic instability factors are directing the behaviors of Kazakh elites to focus on short-term gain, and thereby changing the EVL dynamics, this research offers a comprehensive, theoretical, and up-to date analysis of the significance of domestic political factors as an important explanation of the current economic resource nationalism in Kazakhstan.
【 预 览 】
附件列表
Files
Size
Format
View
A Study on the Origin of Kazakhstan's Economic Resource Nationalism