Regulating Chinese SOEs under the WTO System: Analysis on Legal Effects of GATT/WTO Rules over SOEs in China

WTO;China;State-owned Enterprise (SOE);General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures;General Agreement on Trade in Services;327

국제대학원 국제학과 ;

University:서울대학교 국제대학원

关键词: WTO;    China;    State-owned Enterprise (SOE);    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;    Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures;    General Agreement on Trade in Services;    327;   

Others  :  http://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/129086/1/000000136597.pdf

美国|英语

来源: Seoul National University Open Repository

【 摘 要 】

This research examines the function of GATT/WTO rules applied on Chinese state-owned enterprises after China’s accession to the WTO. The question was raised on the increasingly advancing Chinese SOEs during the past decade, despite the existence of disciplines in the WTO containing anticompetitive behavior by the member countries. The purpose of this thesis is to gauge the applicability of established WTO disciplines to the diverse Chinese SOE activities home and abroad. At the outset, it is imperative to take a look at the existing GATT/WTO rules that addresses or could be applicable to Chinese SOEs. Such provisions were found in the GATT 1994, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and General Agreement on Trade in Services. Next, the following case studies from the dispute settlement cases related to Chinese SOEs are provided to analyze the legal effects of the disciplines. It was verified from the studies that several problems have prevented GATT/WTO rules from applying. First, the members taking countervailing measures on products from China may encounter difficulties during the investigation due to lack of transparency. Most of the time, the investigating country would fail to explicitly determine China’s SOE subsidies in the current situation. Second, highly relevant provisions were disregarded by the complainant members and the adjudicators. Third, in respect of service sector where member itself makes commitments on each sector, Chinese government protecting its sectors with majority of SOEs seems possible. Therefore, the relevant discussions should be made in the WTO negotiations. However, in situation where current Doha Round is mostly suspended, and prospects for future negotiation are unclear, regulating discriminatory activities by the SOEs in China may be possible through bilateral or multilateral Agreements. Also, TPP containing extensive and specific requirements on SOEs may present models to other negotiations.