The Patterns and Determinants of Reasonable Period of Time for Implementation in WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: DSU Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c)

Reasonable Period of Time for Implementation;DSU Article 21.3(b);DSU Article 21.3(c);Particular Circumstances;Dispute Settlement Procedure;Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU);WTO;327

국제대학원 국제학과 ;

University:서울대학교 국제대학원

关键词: Reasonable Period of Time for Implementation;    DSU Article 21.3(b);    DSU Article 21.3(c);    Particular Circumstances;    Dispute Settlement Procedure;    Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU);    WTO;    327;   

Others  :  http://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/126319/1/000000053309.pdf

美国|英语

来源: Seoul National University Open Repository

【 摘 要 】

The time period for compliance, granted to Respondent after completion of WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s (DSB) decision, functions as a key factor to promote trade liberalization via enforcement of WTO provision. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) Article 21.3 lays out specific procedure on how to determine the reasonable period of time (RPT) for implementation. The said provision, however, does not offer which factors or principles shall be considered to determine the duration of RPT.Thus, the objective of this paper is to address this issue by analyzing patterns of RPT from previous WTO disputes, focusing on relationship between duration of RPT and four potential factors: 1) economic status and development level of parties in dispute, 2) protection level of product at issue, 3) means of implementation (administrative or legislative), and 4) effect from violation of specific WTO covered agreement(s) in dispute. As the very first study to apply statistical method of correlation and regression analysis to RPT determined under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c), following findings were drawn. First, the study concluded that special attention to developing countries is not granted easily, especially when developing country requests for special treatment as a complainant. Secondly, it was concluded that protection level of product at issue of respondent and complainant does not affect duration of RPT under both DSU Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c). Moreover, the means of implementation was found to have meaningful connection with length of RPT. RPT from disputes requiring legislative means of implementation for compliance resulted in longer period of time than those requiring administrative means of implementation under both Article 21.3(b) and 21.3(c). Finally, the study found that RPT from disputes covering violation of trade remedy agreements turned out to be shorter than those addressing violation of non－trade remedy agreements, not due to violation of different WTO covered agreement but due to type of means of implementation necessary for compliance. The key findings from statistical and normative analysis of this study implies that RPT is agreed by the parties or awarded by the arbitrator via considering various factors combined as a whole, rather than imposing more weight on a single particular factor than the others. Furthermore, even though prompt compliance to DSB’s recommendation and ruling shall be the prior goal for every losing party who have violated WTO provisions, the patterns of past RPT discussed in this paper would be useful guideline for Members in dispute when adoption of RPT is unavoidable.