Monitoring Versus Incentives

Principal and agent;Moral hazard;Entrepreneurship;Incentives;Monitoring

Gilson, Paul W. R. ; Management

University:Georgia Institute of Technology

Department:Management

关键词: Principal and agent;    Moral hazard;    Entrepreneurship;    Incentives;    Monitoring;   

Others  :  https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/1853/11556/1/gilson_paul_w_200608_phd.pdf

美国|英语

来源: SMARTech Repository

【 摘 要 】

My study examines the relationship between principal and agent in a moral hazard setting where the principal has the ability to monitor the actions of the agent at an interim stage of the project. I show that monitoring can induce the agent to exert higher levels of effort and can result in a reallocation of project payoffs between the two parties. This reallocation is not a one-way street: Situations exist where monitoring encourages greater effort from the agent, resulting in greater project payoffs for both principal and agent. For projects that are characterized as high-risk, high-reward projects where agent involvement is costly, monitoring is often the optimal strategy; this is an explanation for why venture capital type investments are the subject of intense monitoring. When the principal can share monitoring results at an interim stage with the agent, the agent is able to modify his effort levels in certain situations for the benefit of both parties.