What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value

value;interest-relational theory;moral semantics;Metaethics;practical reason;normative reasons;moral absolutism;fact-value distinction;obligation;moral contextualism

Finlay, Stephen F.

关键词: value;    interest-relational theory;    moral semantics;    Metaethics;    practical reason;    normative reasons;    moral absolutism;    fact-value distinction;    obligation;    moral contextualism;   

Others  :  https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/15487/Finlay_Stephen.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

美国|英语

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【 摘 要 】

Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing adesire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity isdependent upon motivation often deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According tothe interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case itsatisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates thatsomething of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe realproperties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires.It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance ofvalue and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, I attackthe alleged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for takingthe means to our ends is explicable in terms of our desire for the end, and not as a command of reason.This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between valuejudgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, theconnection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always madefrom the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entailsmotivation. But often we conversationally borrow external perspectives of desire, and subsequentjudgements do not entail motivation.This analysis drives a critique of a common practice as a misuse of normative language. The"absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, analyze normative language in such a way as tojustify the imposition of certain interests over others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - indenying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, whichis always indexed to some particular set of desires.