There is a puzzle about Hume;;s is-ought gap involving an epistemic `ought;;.From the premise `Snow is white,;; we can infer `Sophia;;s belief that snow is white is correct.;;`Snow is white;; is paradigmatically non-normative, and that Sophia;;s belief is correct, a claim about what belief she ought to have, seems to be normative.The argument seems valid, so the is-ought gap is supposed to block this kind of inference. The puzzle is over whether we should give up on the is-ought game or find another way to resolve the conflict.In the first chapter, I provide a formulation of the is-ought gap in a general semantic framework that avoids some other known problems.I turn in chapter 2 to discussing the puzzle about correct belief. I cast doubt on a solution proposed by Allan Gibbard by showing that it can admit of no epistemology of the normative.In chapter 3, I defend a solution to the puzzle while more directly tackling the question of the nature of oughts for belief.I offer a new explanation of why we ought to believe the truth.At the heart of the account is the idea that it;;s a conceptual truth beliefs ought to be true, which I provide a new argument for.I then claim that being an agent requires being subject to this norm of belief. This results in a non-moral, distinctly doxastic, account of why we ought to believe the truth. My conclusion is that asking why we ought to believe the truth is like asking why a bachelor must be unmarried: the answer is contained in the ideas that make up the question. In the final chapter, I respond to Gibbard;;s claim that an analogous story cannot work for `ought;; claims for degreed belief.I pose a worry for Gibbard;;s proposed alternative explanation, and I undermine Gibbard;;s motivation for pursuing such an account in the first place. By taking belief to have an aim in a normative sense,I sketch how we can make sense of epistemic rationality in terms of that aim.
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