Death and disease exact a heavy toll on citizens in democracies.In response, citizens expect elected politicians to alleviate theirsuffering by providing public health funding to afflictedareas. I argue that the funding of health policy in democracies is subject to distributionalincentives similar to other government policies. Patterns of government control, partisanship, strategic importance and quality of legislative representation condition the provisionof public health funding within countries. In turn, public health spending conditions districtmortality outcomes. I examine evidence from turn of the century France, United Statesand modern India to test this theory. First, I consider qualitative evidence of the distribution of health funds. I then assemble administrative district level electoral, budgetaryand health information and predict levels of health funding and resulting mortality rates.Political importance, not just need, plays a prominent role in determining who lives and diesin democracies. This has profound implications for the plight of modern democracies facingdisease threats.
【 预 览 】
附件列表
Files
Size
Format
View
The political economy of health: death, disease and distribution