Three Essays on the Party Strategies under the Mixed-Member Electoral System.

Comparative Politics;Electoral Systems;Japanese Politics;Mixed-Member Electoral System;Contamination Effect;Incumbency Advantage;Political Science;Social Sciences;Political Science

Umeda, MichioMebane Jr, Walter R. ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Comparative Politics;    Electoral Systems;    Japanese Politics;    Mixed-Member Electoral System;    Contamination Effect;    Incumbency Advantage;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/86305/umedam_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

In this dissertation, I study the effects of electoral reform on party systems and electoral campaigns, based on the case of Japan following the change to a mixed-member electoral system. The dissertation project examines the issue from three different perspectives: two studies focus on the small party survival strategies under the new system, but from different points of view, and one focuses on the changes in incumbency advantage in plurality contests, following reform.In Chapter 2, I reexamine accepted wisdom on the contamination effect: it is rational for small parties to nominate plurality candidates, because they help to mobilize more PR votes. I demonstrate that the mixed results of previous studies are due to inconsistencies between the specific question posed and the methodological tool used. I show that small parties in fact increased their PR vote-share where the party nominated candidates in plurality tier, but the impact was small at the national level. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate an alternative purpose of nominations: blackmailing major parties to adopt policies more desirable to the small parties. I develop a formal model of the interactions between a small leftist party and the center-left major party based on chain-store paradox. The model shows that the small party can persuade the major party to select leftist rather than centrist candidates in a repeated game, regardless of the median voter preferences. The empirical data clearly supports the model.In Chapter 4, I study the magnitude of incumbency advantage after electoral reform, which could help unpopular incumbents remain in power. I utilize the mechanisms of the double candidacy system for a natural experiment. The model shows that the parties/candidates with PR incumbency performed 2-3% better in the plurality vote-share in the districts than those without seats. This result suggests that the double candidacy system hurts the incumbents, counter to the conventional wisdom.