"You want me to do what?!" : a reasonable response to overly demanding moral theories

Ethical problems;Ethics;Blame;Responsibility;Human behavior--Philosophy

Slater, Joe ; Snedegar, Justin ; Snedegar, Justin

University:University of St Andrews

Department:Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies (School of)

关键词: Ethical problems;    Ethics;    Blame;    Responsibility;    Human behavior--Philosophy;   

Others  :  https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/15546/JoeSlaterPhDThesis.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

来源: DR-NTU

【 摘 要 】

This thesis is about demandingness objections. It is claimed that variousmoral theories ask too much of moral agents, and for that reason should berejected or modified accordingly. In the first chapter, I consider what thisobjection entails, particularly distinguishing it from Bernard Williams's integrityobjection. The second chapter investigates several attempts to underminethe objection. I contend that their arguments for a more burdensomeconception of morality fail, and that accepting their `extreme' view wouldleave us unable to explain much of our moral phenomenology. In the thirdchapter, I analyse what features of a moral theory make it susceptible todemandingness objections. Through this discussion I highlight social factors(the conduct and expectations of one's community) and psychological factorsas potential candidates for generating the problem. Making use of thesepotential diagnoses, in chapter four, I examine (but ultimately reject) theresponses to demandingness objections by Richard Miller and Liam Murphy,which can provide verdicts sensitive to these features.In the fifth chapter, I examine the concept of blame and its relationshipto moral wrongness. Noting this relationship and how an action's difficultycan affect whether we deem conduct blameworthy, I consider a recent proposalby Brian McElwee, that the difficulty of certain actions explains whythey are too demanding. I reject this proposal, instead regarding difficultyas providing excuse conditions. However, through the discussion I drawattention to the fact that sub-optimal behaviour often does not need anexcuse, suggesting that there is no `default' obligation to do the best. Inthe final chapter, I offer a way to consider how obligations are generated,utilising the concept of reasonableness. By incorporating this concept, andgiving it a relativistic analysis, I suggest a theory can avoid demandingnessobjections.