Causation and responsibility : four aspects of their relation

Causation;Responsibility;Consequentialism (Ethics)

Tarnovanu, Horia ; Cruft, Rowan ; Cruft, Rowan

University:University of St Andrews

Department:Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies (School of)

关键词: Causation;    Responsibility;    Consequentialism (Ethics);   

Others  :  https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/7060/HoriaTarnovanuPhDThesis.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

来源: DR-NTU

【 摘 要 】

The concept of causation is essential to ascribing moral and legal responsibility since the only way anagent can make a difference in the world is through her acts causing things to happen. Yet the extentand manner in which the complex features of causation bear on responsibility ascriptions remainunclear. I present an analysis of four aspects of causation which yields new insights into differentproperties of responsibility and offers increased plausibility to certain moral views.Chapter I examines the realist assumption that causation is an objective and mind-independentrelation between space-time located relata – a postulate meant to provide moral assessment with anaturalistic basis and make moral properties continuous with a scientific view of the world. I argue thatsuch a realist stance is problematic, and by extension so are the views seeking to tie responsibilityattributions to an objective relation.Chapter II combines the context sensitivity of causal claims with the plausible idea thatresponsibility ascriptions rest on the assessment of causal sequences relating agents and consequences.I argue that taking context sensitivity seriously compels us to face a choice between moral contrastivismand a mild version of scepticism, viz. responsibility is not impossible, but ultimately difficult to identifywith confidence. I show why the latter view is preferable.Chapter III explores the concern that group agents would causally (and morally) overdeterminethe effects already caused by their constituent individuals. I argue that non-reductive views of agencyand responsibility lack a coherent causal story about how group agents impact the world as relativelyindependent entities. I explain the practical importance of higher-order entities and suggest a fictionaliststance towards group agency talk.Chapter IV analyses the puzzle of effect selection – if causes have infinitely many effects, butonly one or a few are mentioned in causal claims, what determines their selection from the complete setof consequents? I argue that the criteria governing the difference between effects and by-products lackclarity and stability. I use the concerns about appropriate effect selection to formulate an epistemicargument against consequentialism.