Embedded Judicial Autonomy: How NGOs and Public Opinion Influence Indonesia'sConstitutional Court

Indonesia;constitutional court;judicial politics;natural language processing;social movements;Political Science;Social Sciences (General);Southeast Asian and Pacific Languages and Cultures;Social Sciences;Political Science

Nardi Jr, DominicMebane Jr, Walter R ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Indonesia;    constitutional court;    judicial politics;    natural language processing;    social movements;    Political Science;    Social Sciences (General);    Southeast Asian and Pacific Languages and Cultures;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/144040/dnardi_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

This dissertation is an empirical attempt to explain how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and public opinion influence Indonesia;;s Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi). In doing so, it argues that the extent to which a court interacts with and responds to civil society - its ;;embeddedness;; - is an important indicator of judicial empowerment. Embedded courts are better able to rely upon external stakeholders to bring important policy questions to the court;;s attention, provide it with relevant and accurate information, and protect the institution from government reprisals. The dissertation analyzes three mechanisms through which litigants interact with and influence the Constitutional Court. First, Indonesian citizens and organizations can file petitions for constitutional review. Because the Court can only adjudicate constitutional questions raised in the petitions, petitioners have considerable power to set the Court;;s agenda. Using an automated topic model, this dissertation finds that NGOs are significantly more likely to file petitions covering socioeconomic rights, such as education and labor, and human rights. This allows NGOs to not only determine which rights claims reach the Court, but also to frame the legal and policy questions for the justices. Second, litigants send signals about public opinion. The Indonesian public can empower the Constitutional Court by detecting and punishing government attempts to undermine judicial decisions. Although the justices do not measure public opinion directly, they can observe the size of the coalition supporting or opposing the petition, which acts as a signal of public opinion. This dissertation finds that the Court is significantly more likely to grant a petition if it is supported by a large number of petitioners. By contrast, it is less likely to do so if it receives a large number of non-litigant briefs opposing the petition. Thus, the justices seem to consider the level of public support for or opposition to petitions when adjudicating cases. Third, litigants can convince the Constitutional Court justices to quote their briefs in the final decision. Justices are more likely to quote a brief if they view the source as credible. Using plagiarism-detection software, this dissertation finds that the justices are more likely to quote text from briefs submitted by NGOs. NGOs possess the resources and expertise necessary to provide accurate information. They also rely heavily on their moral capital and reputation to advance policy goals. This helps persuade the justices to view their briefs as credible and informative. The dissertation utilizes an original dataset of 541 petitions for constitutional review submitted during the terms of the first three chief justices (August 13, 2003 - October 2, 2013), as well as 249 statements from the president, 243 statements from the legislature, 62 briefs from third parties supporting of the petition, and 141 briefs from third parties opposing the petition. This dissertation also makes use of dozens of interviews conducted with lawyers, NGO staff, judges, and scholars in Indonesia about litigation strategies, as well as qualitative analysis of several high-profile cases.