Can Courts Make Federalism Work? A Game Theory Approach to Court-Induced Compliance and Defection in Federal Systems

Economies

Gemma Sala¹ 

[1] Department of Political Science, Grinnell College, 1210 Park Street, Grinnell, IA 50112, USA; E-Mail

关键词: federalism;    constitutional safeguards;    courts;    judicial politics;    game theory;    constitutional politics;    compliance;    coordination;   

DOI  :  10.3390/economies2040193

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

Few studies on federalism analyze the role of courts as safeguards of the federal arrangement, and those that do tend to be too optimistic about what courts can do. This article analyzes the effect of judicial review on the interaction between the central and a regional government in a federation in order to understand the conditions under which courts may or may not enforce compliance with federalism. It argues that politicians of either level of government anticipate the likelihood of a judicial challenge and an eventual veto, and it finds distinct equilibria in the interaction between central and regional governments (imposition, auto-limitation, negotiation and litigation). Only under auto-limitation do courts effectively prevent transgressions to the federal arrangement. In all other scenarios, defection may take place despite the presence of courts. These findings show that as the court’s jurisprudence becomes more solid and defined, the chances for governments to successfully exceed their powers increase. Not only do transgressions take place despite the presence of the court, but because of it.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2014 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.