Regulating and Securing the Interfaces Across Mobile Apps, OS and Users

Mobile Security & Privacy;Android;Mobile Apps;Computer Science;Engineering;Computer Science & Engineering

Feng, HuanPrakash, Atul ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Mobile Security & Privacy;    Android;    Mobile Apps;    Computer Science;    Engineering;    Computer Science & Engineering;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/137033/huanfeng_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

Over the past decade, we have seen a swift move towards a mobile-centered world. This thriving mobile ecosystem builds upon the interplay of three important parties: the mobile user, OS, and app. These parties interact via designated interfaces many of which are newly invented for, or introduced to the mobile platform. Nevertheless, as these new ways of interactions arise in the mobile ecosystem, what is enabled by these communication interfaces often violates the expectations of the communicating parties. This makes the foundation of the mobile ecosystem untrustworthy, causing significant security and privacy hazards. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by: 1) securing the conversations between trusted parties, 2) regulating the interactions between partially trusted parties, and 3) protecting the communications between untrusted parties. We first deal with the case of mobile OS and app, and analyze the Inter-Process Communication (IPC) protocol (Android Binder in particular) between these two untrusted parties. We found that the Android OS is frequently making unrealistic assumptions on the validity (sanity) of transactions from apps, thus creating significant security hazards. We analyzed the root cause of this emerging attack surface and protected this interface by developing an effective, precautionary testing framework and a runtime diagnostic tool. Then, we study the deficiency of how a mobile user interacts with an app that he can only partially trust. In the current mobile ecosystem, information about the same user in different apps can be easily shared and aggregated, which clearly violates the conditional trust mobile user has on each app. This issue is addressed by providing two complementary options: an OS-level extension that allows the user to track and control, during runtime, the potential flow of his information across apps; and a user-level solution that allows the users to maintain multiple isolated profiles for each app. Finally, we elaborate on how to secure the voice interaction channel between two trusted parties, mobile user and OS. The open nature of the voice channel makes applications that depend on voice interactions, such as voice assistants, difficult to secure and exposed to various attacks. We solve this problem by proposing the first system, called VAuth, that provides continuous and usable authentication for voice commands, designed as a wearable security token. It collects the body-surface vibrations of a user via an accelerometer and continuously matches them to the voice commands received by the voice assistant. This way, VAuth guarantees that the voice assistant executes only the commands that originate from the voice of the owner.Overall, this thesis examined the privacy and security issues across various interfaces in the mobile ecosystem, analyzed the trust relationship between different parties and proposed practical solutions. It also documented the experience learned from tackling these problems, and can serve as a reference in dealing with similar issues in other domains.