Essays in Game Theory.

cheap talk;communication;epistemic analysis;cognitive hierarchy;learning;beauty contest;Social Sciences (General);Social Sciences;Economics

Oh, TaejunEliaz, Kfir ;

University of Michigan

关键词: cheap talk;    communication;    epistemic analysis;    cognitive hierarchy;    learning;    beauty contest;    Social Sciences (General);    Social Sciences;    Economics;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/133277/otj_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

I study how to model various strategic interactions with incomplete information and how to properly analyze them. The first chapter of the dissertation suggests new solution concepts for incomplete information games that are preceded by communication opportunities (communication games). Second chapter, written with Tilman Borgers, studies type spaces that model incomplete information among players with a specific property: the independence property. Third chapter suggests a new behavioral model to study real world decision makers;; behavior.In the first chapter, I suggest new solution concepts for communication games to solve the following problem: traditional equilibrium analysis for communication games does not properly explain uncertainties about players;; communication strategies, and so it excludes plausible outcomes of communication games from the set of equilibrium outcomes. Thus, I define correlated cheap talk equilibrium and correlated communication equilibrium. Epistemic analysis shows that new definitions represent the common knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with a common prior for a given communication game.In the second chapter, we study common prior type spaces in which for each agent the agent;;s payoff type and the agent;;s belief type are independent. Such type spaces deserve attention as the polar opposites of common prior type spaces in which agents;; beliefs determine their preferences - a class of type spaces whose special properties are much studied. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for the independence of each agent;;s payoff type and belief type. Different agents;; payoff types must be independent. Agents may hold payoff irrelevant information that must be jointly independent of all agents;; payoff types.In the third chapter, I suggest a modified cognitive hierarchy (CH) model. Players have cognitive types which characterize their iterative reasoning abilities.Players know the existence of higher type players. In order to estimate higher type players;; choices, players use other players;; past choice data. Players improve their estimation with more information. The new model improves the original CH model by Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004), the replicator dynamics, and the fictitious play in explaining experimental results of the repeated beauty contest game and explaining the repeated market entry game.