Knowing by Example: A Social-Cognitive Approach to Epistemology.

epistemology;analysis of knowledge;Gettier problem;Philosophy;Psychology;Humanities;Social Sciences;Philosophy

Lent, Jeremy A. B.Aarnio, Maria Lasonen ;

University of Michigan

关键词: epistemology;    analysis of knowledge;    Gettier problem;    Philosophy;    Psychology;    Humanities;    Social Sciences;    Philosophy;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/133254/jerlent_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

In this dissertation, I explore the ;;problem of knowledge” in epistemology from a new angle. Rather than proposing conditions for when it is true or false that someone’s belief constitutes knowledge, I take as my challenge the problem of explaining why we use the words ;;know” and ;;knowledge” in the ways that we do. Ever since Edmund Gettier’s 1963 paper ;;Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, epistemologists have uncovered many puzzling aspects of how we use these two words. In Chapter 2, I hypothesize that our human ancestors developed a word to urge others to be certain (or not) of particular facts. Because this word was understood to invoke objective reasons, the message conveyed was not only ;;I advise us to be certain that such-and-such” but also (at least implicitly) ;;I would advise anyone in a position similar to ours to do likewise”. I suggest that our word ;;know” is the descendant of this ancestral word, and continues to carry a ;;prospective” advisory message. I show that this hypothesis accounts for several features of our word ;;know”, such as that we apply it only when truth, certainty, and justification are present. In Chapters 3 and 4, I use the hypothesis to explain why philosophers have the verdicts they do on many puzzling cases of ;;true belief without knowledge” that have been discussed in the epistemology literature. In Chapter 5, I use my hypothesis to explain the results of several recent experiments conducted to test non-philosophers’ judgments about these same cases. In Chapter 6, I conclude that my hypothesis is the best available explanation for all of the puzzling features of our modern-day uses of ;;know”. We should thereby provisionally accept that my hypothesis (or something like it) gives the truth about the development and functioning of our word ;;know”. Although my hypothesis belongs to the domains of evolutionary biology and social-cognitive psychology, I argue that it also counts as a piece of philosophy: It helps us to understand puzzling features of our lives, not for any instrumental reason but simply for the sake of understanding.