A Brave New World: Studies on the Deployment and Security of the Emerging IPv6 Internet.

Internet;Internet Protocol;IPv4;IPv6;Network Security;Computer Science;Engineering;Computer Science and Engineering

Czyz, Jakub JerzyJahanian, Farnam ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Internet;    Internet Protocol;    IPv4;    IPv6;    Network Security;    Computer Science;    Engineering;    Computer Science and Engineering;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/120689/jczyz_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

Recent IPv4 address exhaustion events are ushering in a new era ofrapid transition to the next generation Internet protocol---IPv6. ViaInternet-scale experiments and data analysis, this dissertationcharacterizes the adoption and security of the emerging IPv6 network.The work includes three studies, each the largest of its kind,examining various facets of the new network protocol;;s deployment,routing maturity, and security.The first study provides an analysis of ten years of IPv6 deploymentdata, including quantifying twelve metrics across ten global-scaledatasets, and affording a holistic understanding of the state andrecent progress of the IPv6 transition. Based on cross-datasetanalysis of relative global adoption rates and across features of theprotocol, we find evidence of a marked shift in the pace and natureof adoption in recent years and observe that higher-level metrics ofadoption lag lower-level metrics.Next, a network telescope study covering the IPv6 address space of themajority of allocated networks provides insight into the early stateof IPv6 routing. Our analyses suggest that routing of average IPv6prefixes is less stable than that of IPv4. This instability isresponsible for the majority of the captured misdirected IPv6 traffic.Observed dark (unallocated destination) IPv6 traffic shows substantialdifferences from the unwanted traffic seen in IPv4---in both characterand scale.Finally, a third study examines the state of IPv6 network securitypolicy.We tested a sample of 25 thousand routers and 520 thousandservers against sets of TCP and UDP ports commonly targeted byattackers. We found systemic discrepancies between intendedsecurity policy---as codified in IPv4---and deployed IPv6 policy.Such lapses in ensuring that the IPv6 network is properly managed andsecured are leaving thousands of important devices more vulnerable toattack than before IPv6 was enabled.Taken together, findings from our three studies suggest that IPv6 hasreached a level and pace of adoption, and shows patterns of use, thatindicates serious production employment of the protocol on a broadscale. However, weaker IPv6 routing and security are evident, andthese are leaving early dual-stack networks less robust than the IPv4networks they augment.